by Clementine Pierrefeu
edited by Jamie Miura
Introduction
On September 26, 2018, China donated two crested ibises to Japan, symbolically breaking up with the decade-old tensions between them in the context of a trade war with the United States.
At best, China’s political stance regarding Japan appears paradoxical: Sino-Japanese diplomatic relations suffer from World War II’s (hereafter WWII) legacy; yet, they are mutually vital economic partners, making it impossible to sever their ties. Furthermore, a closer analysis of these dynamics reveals the Chinese government’s double game to maintain an equilibrium between domestic and foreign policies. In discussion of Sino-Japanese tensions, a controversial issue touches upon the long-term viability of China’s ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’ toward Japan.
While some argue that the survival of the Chinese Communist Party (hereafter CCP) depends on the state’s authoritarian resilience in allowing and prohibiting anti-Japanese protests,[1] recent events show warming relations between China and Japan due to the US trade war. However, a closer examination reveals that the convergence conveniently overlooks unresolved disputes. Expressly, China’s actual convergence toward Japan is not a sign of better Sino-Japanese relations: it is exclusively economic in nature and was triggered by the U.S trade war.
The war: a source of ongoing contentions and unrest
These last months, Sino-Japanese relations improved as a response to the U.S trade war targeting the Japanese and, on a greater scale, the Chinese economies. This paper will prove the futility of this convergence examining the insufficiency of economics when facing diplomatic grievances: China holds onto a violent past of war crimes committed by Japan, the CCP manipulates anti-Japanese sentiments to protect its legitimacy, and China’s military gradually asserts itself as the regional hegemon rivaling Japan. Trade war or not, economics will not save their relations. China and Japan’s aggressive relationship dwells in a violent history of war crimes committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during WWII. In 1931, Japan invaded Manchuria, beginning a decade-long violent Japanese-lead colonial rule defined by large-scale massacres, slavery, and torture. The 1937 Nanking Massacre is the most ill-famed illustration of Japanese colonialism. In the first six weeks of the invasion, the Japanese Imperial Army was responsible for the death of 300,000 Chinese and the rape of 20,000 to 80,000 women.[2] The long-term effect of these crimes contributed to and are still impacting the after-war tensions between China and Japan.
Furthermore, General MacArthur’s decision to keep Emperor Hirohito after WWII is an important legacy of the US’s occupation.[3] Relying on the imperial authority made the occupation smoother. However, Emperor Hirohito, the head of state during WWII, not only remained in office; he was also absolved from the responsibilities of the imperial army’s war crimes.[4] For stability’s sake, the US exonerated the highest authority in the country during the war.[5] Although high-ranking military officers were condemned, the Emperor’s absolution accentuated a Japanese tendency to view themselves as victims of their government, instead of stressing the weight of national responsibility.[6] Japan continues to minimize its inconvenient past. The controversial visits of Yasukuni shrine, where Class A war-crime perpetrators and high-ranking officials are buried, shows the Japanese government’s shift in its interpretation of history, slipping to a less repentant tone.[7]
Moreover, the population is also involved because of official history textbooks minimizing Japan’s crimes. The 1982 Textbook controversy exposed the embellished wording of WWII Japan’s crimes in China.[8] This bias reinforces China’s hostility toward Japan as evidence of disrespect.[9] The gap widens: while Chinese remember these events, Japanese consider them as old history, making China’s claims hard to relate to. Despite protests from China and international condemnation, Japan’s apologies lead to no change.[10]
Based on Japan’s role in WWII, how is the Japanese government handling its national memory? Indeed, there is a gap between Japan’s repeated apologies to China and its actions. Victimization is taking over national responsibility,[11] preventing China from moving forward.
‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’:
The Communist Party’s stance toward Japan
The CCP seeks to expand its control deeply and widely over the Chinese territory as a means to preserve its legitimacy and social stability. Local governments, through the Cadres Evaluation System, are put under tremendous pressure by the central state to ensure social stability.[12] Chen et al.’s experiment showed how the threat of collective action from societal actors is the main motive that engenders government responsiveness.[13] These findings raise the following question: why is the government so desperate to prevent “a vague threat of small-scale collective action”[14] when it also encourages big-scale nationalist demonstrations?
On the other hand, nationalist demonstrations are welcomed by the central government. When collective action is the source of social instability, it can become a blessing in boosting the Communist Party’s legitimacy when needed.[15] Anger directed toward an external other is anger not directed to the state. When met with such outcries, the state can present itself as responsive to its citizens’ demands by adapting a policy or a diplomatic stance.[16] With this strategy, it not only appears as an ally of the people, but also protects the state from unwanted criticism.
Consequently, an authoritarian government such as China, when faced with nationalist demonstrations, has to resolve the following dilemma: repressing nationalist demonstrations can backfire on the government and hinder its legitimacy. However, a demonstration might serve to socially destabilize society and threaten the authoritarian state.[17] Weiss presents this dilemma in terms of constant calculations the state has to do to handle the demonstrations. On one hand, to preserve itself from the public’s fire, the state has to avoid repressing every nationalist movement.[18] If the government is too repressive of nationalism, the protesters will label the government as unpatriotic and act in defiance to the government.[19] On the other hand, letting the protests grow without any restraints poses a threat to stability as there is a risk of degenerating into social instability.[20] The more a protest escalates, the greater the cost to shut it down will be.
Strictly speaking, the CCP often finds itself in an awkward position, navigating between two conflicting claims: domestic anti-Japanese sentiment, and the need for stable economic relations with Japan. Reilly points out the tendency of the Chinese government to put aside the first claim in order to secure economic deals and strong trading relations with Japan.[21] After Mao’s successor Deng Xiaoping implemented heavy domestic economic reforms to industrialize the country, China had to open its doors to international trade. At that time, Japan was the second most powerful economy in the world following the US, and a potential investor that could help China on the path of modernization.[22] However, the apparent convergence is artificial, as the negative domestic opinion will continue to be a source of protest because of a government that stays deaf to its population’s nationalist claims.
The Chinese government maintains a careful balance between domestic and diplomatic claims with the ‘Hot Economics, Cold Politics’ strategy with Japan: it wields the public opinion’s anti-Japanese sentiments depending on the need to both boost its legitimacy and normalize its diplomatic and economic ties with Japan.
China’s ambition of territorial and influential expansion
China has territorial disputes with countries such as Vietnam and Japan over islands, or the Kashmir region with India; the country also asserts its growing military power over Asia with the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy. According to Pehrson, the ‘String of Pearls’ strategy refers to “China’s rising geopolitical influence through efforts to increase access to ports and airfields, develop special diplomatic relationships, and modernize military forces.”[23] Firstly, I will discuss the Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands; secondly, I will approach the regional expansion of the Chinese military influence.
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands have a long history that takes root in the contentious past between China and Japan. First ‘won’ by the Japanese in the 1895 Sino-Japanese War, they were administered by the US during the post-WWII period, before being returned to Japan when the occupation ended in 1972.[24] These repeated changes in ownership added confusion on top of the nationalist claims from both the Japanese and Chinese side, further fueling the dispute and adding to the already long list of contentions between China and Japan. Although the islands are legally Japan’s property, China challenges its authority asserting that Japan illegally annexed the islands after the 1895 Sino-Japanese War.[25]
Since the retrocession of the islands to Japan in 1972, the tensions between China and Japan kept growing, until they reached their peak during the 2012. In 2012, the Japanese government announced the nationalization of the islands after buying them from a Japanese private owner.[26] The islands have been leased by the Japanese government since the 1970s from a Japanese family.[27] Although the Japanese government insisted that the purchase was peaceful, the Chinese government sent several warnings, declarations, and patrol ships to reassert its claim over the three islands, but avoided sending military force.[28] The Japanese decision was met with a wave of protests throughout China: more than a hundred Chinese cities became stages for protests during which the participants lashed out at Japanese companies, stores, cars, resulting in a major departure of Japanese businesses from China.[29] Although China benefits from stable economic relations with Japan, the government did little to prevent the protests from spreading. Yet, as it was exposed earlier, the CCP has the capacity to harness domestic nationalist sentiment when necessary, and its inaction further damaged the Sino-Japanese diplomatic and economic relations to this day.[30]
The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute is part of a broader logic of Chinese’s expansionism across Asia. In their book, Pehrson et al. refer to the ‘string of pearls’ as “a nexus of Chinese geopolitical influence or military presence”.[31] China’s presence in South Asia represents a major economic asset for the country as the latter can control the major maritime trading routes of the region.[32] By building military bases on its neighbors’ territory in Asia, China is able to spread its growing influence across the Asian region now indisputably dominated by the US military.[33]
While the US military remains the undisputed military power in the region and throughout the world, the Chinese army is the world’s most numerous. Fig.1 shows a steep rise in military expenditure in China between 2000 and 2015, starting from US$20bn in 2000 and reaching US$230bn in 2015. In other words, the Chinese military expenditure is approximatively 11.5 times higher compared to thirty years ago. Nonetheless, the US still dedicates nearly three times more financial resources for the military. This development can be analyzed through different lenses: China, after overtaking US economy’s growth rate in 2014, continues its development militarily. It can also be seen as a strategy to balance the Japanese influence as a regional superpower historically backed by the US military.[34] However, China presents this development and expansion as nonaggressive as possible: indeed, attracting the international community condemnation and the US’s wrath would go counter to China’s interests.[35]
Fig. 1. World Bank Open Data, “China and United States Military Expenditure
from 1989 to 2017 (Current USD)”. World Bank Open Data.
A superficial honeymoon between Japan and China: the limits of trade
The previous parts discussed the extent of historical, diplomatic, and military tensions existing between China and Japan. Exploring the width and the depth of the tensions revealed the limits of economics as a solution to improve Sino-Japanese relations on the long-term. Although economic interdependency can foster peaceful diplomatic ties, Sino-Japanese relations’ painful history is too big of an obstacle, especially as it not resolved nor addressed. This umpteenth Chinese attempt to improve diplomatic ties was caused by the US trade war threatening its economy. Japan is not an ally to China, but merely replaces the US in order to limit the trade war’s damages to the Chinese economy.
China’s two most important trade partners are the US and Japan. I collected numbers from the IMF Direction of Trade Statistics to illustrate the strength of Chinese economic relations with the US and Japan, compared to the rest if the world. Fig.2 encompasses years from 2012 to 2017, from which I isolated the US and Japan’s imports and exports data. China’s economic relations with the US are so important that, in 2017, its exports to the US represented twice (US$433.7bn) its exports to the entire Eurozone area (US$264.8bn). Moreover, most of Chinese profits with the US come from exportations. In 2017, Chinese exports represented US$433.7bn, approximately three times more than the US$154.9bn imports from the US. Fig.2 also indicates a slight but constant decline in both imports and exports after 2012, a year during which Sino-Japanese relations were severely damaged with the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident. In a trade war with the US, China’s best option to limit the damages is indeed to turn to its second partner: Japan.
Fig. 2. IMF, 2018, “China, P.R.: Mainland – DOT 2018.” IMF Data 2018.
Considering fig.2’s data on Chinese exports to the US, the US trade war started by the Trump administration poses a dramatic threat to China. With a trade war targeting the Chinese economy, the Trump administration hopes it can cut U.S trade deficit by US$200bn.[36] However, the American economy’s most important profits come from Chinese exports to the US, and losing its biggest market would harm American economic growth. According to the IMF, a trade war represents a danger not only to the two involved parties’ economic growth, but to the international community at large.[37] Indeed, a trade war easily leads to a buildup: in response to US tax raising on various Chinese goods in April 2018, China adopted a similar list, raising the tax of different products imported from the US.[38] Lumping one’s assets all together in one pot is hazardous in case of arising tensions.
Nonetheless, China found a solution to the imminent crisis, and decided to turn to the Japanese economy, its second most important trade partner. From the moment the trade war effectively began, China and Japan both made moves toward each other, signaling their willingness to improving their diplomatic relations. It is important to stress that this development is not one-sided, but bilateral. Although China is more severely affected, both China and Japan suffer economically from Trump administration’s “America First” policy.[39] As explained in part III, following the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident in 2012, Sino-Japanese diplomatic ties were at their coldest, until their relations started to show signs of improvement in 2018. Here is a chronology of the Sino-Japanese fast-paced convergence, concurrently to the trade war happening between China and the US. On May 9, 2018, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang visited Japan[40] and donated to Japan, for the first time in eleven years, a pair of crested ibises.[41] During the Eastern Economic Forum in Russia on September 11-13, 2018, China offered Japan the opportunity to participate in the ‘Road and Belt Initiative’ project.[42] In October 2018, the countries decided to resume fleet visits for the first time since 2011.[43] Finally, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe visited Beijing for the first time in six years on October 25, 2018.[44] These events cannot be mistaken for a diplomatic improvement of Sino-Japanese relations. They are not meant to establish peaceful ties, but only to secure a reliable trade partner. None of these diplomatic visits, gifts, or deals once mentioned historical grievances or territorial claims. We can easily say that, until now, both China and Japan conveniently left out any thorny issues from the negotiation table.
Fig. 3. Japanese Constitution, “Chapter II, Renunciation of War – Article 9.” THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, The Government of Japan, 3 Nov. 1946.
Yet, this rushed warming up is fragile due to its exclusively economic nature. Symbolic moves are made, but they do not make up for the past and current contentions between China and Japan; they merely turn a blind eye to them temporarily. The Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute is not yet resolved, the Japanese and Chinese people still hold negative views of each other, and, most importantly, a controversial debate in Japan is raging about changing the pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution (cf Fig. 3). Despite a positive public opinion in maintaining Article 9, the National Diet, Japan’s national legislature already reinterpreted the Constitution to provide military assistance to allies as well as to allow the Self Defense Forces (SDF) to fight on foreign soil abroad.[45] Based on what has been discussed throughout this paper, it is more likely than not that China will feel threatened by Japanese militarization.
Conclusion
This paper aimed to demonstrate the limited utility of trade to improve Sino-Japanese relations. Although Sino-Japanese relations fluctuates through time, there seem to be an overall trend of flourishing economic relations and stagnating diplomatic ties. Both sides actively work against long-term ameliorations, and while several unresolved territorial and historical disputes remain, facing the threat of the US trade war, China saw Japan as a necessary partner. The actual improvement of Sino-Japanese relations is artificial: the exclusively economic nature of the convergence is too frail to endure. The region is evolving quickly with the growing control of Chinese military in the Asian seas. Symmetrically, in Japan, debates about amending the pacifist Article 9 of the Constitution raise the possibility of a widening of the scope of Japanese military activity. This, combined with the US heading toward a new protectionist era, would leave the region unstable. Even with strong economic relations, any Japanese military move will threaten a China that will certainly not stay passive. Unless a mutual decision to resolve disputes and move forward emerges, Sino-Japanese relations will remain subject to the surrounding political climate.
Clementine Pierrefeu is a U2 student pursuing a double major in Political Science and East Asian Studies. Having spent her life thus far moving from Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and North America, she developed a sentimental bond with East and South-East Asia, along with a special interest for Japan and its culture. Additionally, her main interest is the study of conflict resolution through the practice of arbitration or mediation. From this perspective, she seeks to learn more about the Sino-Japanese relations, their history, and explore potential solutions to improve them.
NOTES
[1] Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. (Columbia University Press, 2011. Columbia Scholarship Online, 2015), 2
[2] Moore, Gregory. 2010. “History, Nationalism and Face in Sino-Japanese Relations.” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 289
[3] Takahashi, Tetsuya. “History and Judgment: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal,” Can Philosophy Constitute Resistance? (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2008), 108
[4] Dongyu, Han. 2017. “An Analysis of Japan’s Interpretation of History Over the Seven Postwar Decades.” Social Sciences in China 38 (3): 47–64, 54
[5] Takahashi, Tetsuya. “History and Judgment: The Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal,” Can Philosophy Constitute Resistance? Tokyo: University of Tokyo Center for Philosophy, 2008, 108
[6] Ibid, 101
[7] Dongyu, Han. 2017. “An Analysis of Japan’s Interpretation of History Over the Seven Postwar Decades.” Social Sciences in China 38 (3): 47–64, 48
Fukuoka, Kazuya. 2011. “School History Textbooks and Historical Memories in Japan: A Study of Reception.” International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society, 85
[9] Ibid, 85
[10] Ibid, 86
[11] Ibid, 86
[12] Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China.” (American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2, 2016), 396
[13] Ibid, 397
[14] Chen, Jidong, Jennifer Pan, and Yiqing Xu. “Sources of Authoritarian Responsiveness: A Field Experiment in China.” (American Journal of Political Science 60, no. 2, 2016), 396
[15] Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. (Columbia University Press, 2011. Columbia Scholarship Online, 2015), 24
[16] Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. (Columbia University Press, 2011. Columbia Scholarship Online, 2015), 24
[17] Weiss, Jessica Chen. Powerful Patriots: Nationalist Protest in China’s Foreign Relations. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2014), 17
[18] Ibid, 20
[19] Ibid, 21
[20] Ibid, 21
[21] Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. (Columbia University Press, 2011. Columbia Scholarship Online, 2015), 55
[22] Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. (Columbia University Press, 2011. Columbia Scholarship Online, 2015), 55
[23] Pehrson, Christopher J, and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. 2006. String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral. (Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), V
[24] Cho, Hyun Joo, and Ajin Choi. 2016. “Why Do Territorial Disputes Escalate? A Domestic Political Explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute.” Pacific Focus 31 (2), 255
[25] Ibid, 255
[26] Ibid. 2016, 256
[27] Takenaka, Kiyoshi. “Japan Buys Disputed Islands, China Sends Patrol Ships.” (Reuters. September 11, 2012, Accessed March 23, 2019)
[28] Ibid
[29] Cho, Hyun Joo, and Ajin Choi. 2016. “Why Do Territorial Disputes Escalate? A Domestic Political Explanation for the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute.” Pacific Focus 31 (2), 271
[30] Ibid, 269
[31] Pehrson, Christopher J, and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. 2006. String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral. (Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 3
[32] Brewster, David. “Silk Roads and Strings of Pearls: The Strategic Geography of China’s New Pathways in the Indian Ocean.” (Geopolitics, vol. 22, no. 2, Apr. 2017), 278
[33] Pehrson, Christopher J, and Army War College (U.S.). Strategic Studies Institute. 2006. String of Pearls: Meeting the Challenge of China’s Rising Power Across the Asian Littoral. (Carlisle Papers in Security Strategy. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College), 11
[34] Ibid, 9
[35] Ibid, 14
[36] Lu, Feng. 2018. “China-Us Trade Disputes in 2018: An Overview.” China & World Economy 26 (5), 90
[37] Ibid, 84
[38] Lu, Feng. 2018. “China-Us Trade Disputes in 2018: An Overview.” China & World Economy 26 (5), 83
[39] Ibid, 87
[40] Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Premier of the State Council of China Li Keqiang Visits Japan Japan-China Summit Meeting and Banquet.” (外務省: 国際社会における人権・民主主義(我が国の基本的考え方), 9 May 2018)
[41] Tamiyuki, Kihara. “China to Provide Japan with Crested Ibis Pair as Ties Improving：The Asahi Shimbun.” (The Asahi Shimbun, 朝日新聞デジタル, 7 May 2018)
[42] Osaki, Tomohiro. “Abe-Xi Summit Comes as Chinese Leader Looks to Create United Front amid U.S. Trade War.” (The Japan Times, 21 Oct. 2018)
[43] Kyodo. “Japan and China to Resume Fleet Visits for First Time since 2011.” (The Japan Times, 22 Oct. 2018)
[44] Johnson, Jesse. “Ahead of Abe’s Visit to Beijing a Look at Japan-China Ties through the Years.” (The Japan Times, 21 Oct. 2018)
[45] Shibuichi, D. 2017. “The Article 9 Association, Leftist Elites, and the Movement to Save Article 9 of Japan’s Postwar Constitution.” (East Asia -Piscataway- 34 (2): 147–61), 148
[46] World Bank Open Data, “China and United States Military Expenditure from 1989 to 2017 (Current USD)”. World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.CD?end=2017&locations=CN-US&start=1989)
[47] IMF, 2018, “China, P.R.: Mainland – DOT 2018.” IMF Data 2018, data.imf.org/?sk=9D6028D4-F14A-464C-A2F2-59B2CD424B85&sId=1539174008154.
[48] Japanese Constitution, “Chapter II, Renunciation of War – Article 9.” THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN, The Government of Japan, 3 Nov. 1946, japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html.
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Orientations - McGill University's East Asian Studies Journal 